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Abstract: Next to the taking of lives and the destruction of infrastructure, violent conflict also 
affects the long-term growth path of a country by its effect on human capital accumulation. 
This paper investigates the effect of exposure to violent conflict on the completion of primary 
schooling. We use a nationwide household survey that collected detailed education, 
migration, gender and wealth data and combine this with secondary sources on the location 
and timing of the conflict. Depending on specification we find that the odds to complete 
primary schooling for a child exposed to the violence declined by 40 to 50% compared to a 
non-exposed child. The schooling of boys from non-poor households is affected most by 
conflict, followed by boys and girls from poor households. The schooling of girls from non-
poor households is least affected. Forced displacement is found to be one of the channels 
through which the impact is felt. We perform robustness checks for our results. 
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1. Introduction 
During the past 30 years, civil conflict affected almost three-fourths of all 
countries in sub-Saharan Africa (Gleditsch et al. 2002). Academic economist and other 
social scientists have begun focusing on this topic, trying to understand the causes of war 
and its role in reducing growth and development (Collier and Hoeffler 1998; Miguel, 
Satyanath, and Sergenti 2004; Guidolin and La Ferrara 2007). The nature and magnitude 
of a conflict’s long-term economic consequences are debated in the literature. Davis and 
Weinstein (2002) for Japan; Brakman, Garretsen, and Schramm (2004) for Germany; 
Miguel and Roland (2006) for Vietnam; Bellows and Miguel (2006) for Sierra Leone find 
rapid economic recovery after civil war.  Convergence towards the country’s long-term 
growth path is reached relatively fast, often within 15 years, as a neo-classical growth 
model would predict.  Nevertheless, this macro-economic, aggregate picture does not 
seem to square with the immediate negative economic impacts through the destruction of 
productive capacity and the disruption of normal activity.    
The relatively fast rate of convergence to the longer-term growth path of the 
economy does not tell us who is responsible for the recovery. Imagine the fate of Guido, 
a civil engineer and his younger niece Nathalie. If war breaks out when Guido is in his 
thirties, he will not be able to use his skills as a civilian engineer for peaceful purposes 
during the war. But, under the assumption of his survival, he will be able to put them 
again into productive use again after the war, when he is in his forties. His generation can 
thus shoulder the economic recovery. The same cannot be said of Nathalie who was in 
her teens during the war and lost out of her secondary and potentially university 
education. She will have accumulated less human capital than she otherwise would have 
and her generation may not be able to shoulder the recovery the country needs, at least 
not in the immediate aftermath of conflict. 1  The point is that we have to do with a cohort 
effect that has to work all its way through the demographic pyramid. The longer-term 
impact, in particular in terms of foregone schooling, may only be felt many years after 
the end of the recovery, beyond a period of 10 to 20 years that one would normally 
consider as a period of economic recovery. By the same token, as Nathalie was not able 
                                                 
1 During his frequent visits to Central Africa the first author has noticed how hard generations of young 
adults try to make up for their lost education in the post-conflict period, witnessed by the organization of 
evening programs and the blossoming of private universities. 
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to finish her education she may have decided to marry earlier than she would have in the 
absence of war. This could for example be for reasons of personal safety, income security 
or death of a parent. Earlier marriage could in turn increase the number of children that 
Nathalie will have.  
 The heterogeneity of the potential impact of conflict on birth cohorts also counts 
for gender. There is no universal rule to predict what that impact will be. Existing gender 
inequalities may be exacerbated during violent conflict, but they may also be attenuated. 
The direction of the effect is an empirical question. It may be that they are exacerbated in 
one domain, e.g. sexual violence, but at the same time the conflict may offer new 
opportunities, e.g. in paid labor or business. The direction of the effects as well as their 
magnitude will differ from country to country and context to context, depending on pre-
existing gender inequalities, the type of conflict, the duration of the conflict and the 
institutional particularities of the war-affected country.   
When, for example, the conflicting parties engage child soldiers, it is likely that 
boys are more affected than girls. Similarly, when a country needs the brains and work 
effort of young women such as Nathalie to work in the military industry during a long 
standing militarized dispute with a neighbor, the labor market position of women stands 
to benefit from that conflict. In contrast, when a liberal society with relatively good 
access for girls to education is overrun by a violent anti-liberal rebellion, women are 
often the first victims as they may not anymore be allowed to go to school.  
We focus in this paper on the effect of civil war on schooling. We want to know 
the direction and magnitude of such effect in terms of foregone schooling for both boys 
and girls. If schooling is negatively affected, then this may in turn affect subsequent 
choices and opportunities for both man and women in Burundi, including access to paid 
labor, age at marriage, number of children, socio-economic characteristics of the spouse, 
and so on. The level of schooling attained as a child and young adult is a fundamental 
driver of welfare throughout one’s entire life. 
We find that the completion of primary schooling in Burundi is heavily effected 
by the massacres (1993-1994) and the civil war (1995-2005), for boys as well as for girls. 
For every year that a school-aged boy was exposed to conflict in his province of 
residence, the odds to complete primary schooling decreases by around 50 to 60% 
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depending on specification. For girls the odds decrease by around 20 to 30% per year of 
exposure during school-age. The results for boys are robust for all specifications, 
including province fixed effect and household random effects regression models. Results 
for girls are robust in most specifications. 
 In this paper we also investigate several channels through which violent conflict 
affects schooling, to wit exposure to violence in one’s community as well as forced 
migration. Displaced children may be deprived of education but also of the support 
provided by educational structures in unstable or violent settings. The availability and 
quality of education in refugee or IDP camps may vary a lot, from well-organised to 
absent or very disorganised. Accessing schools outside the camps may not be an option 
due to issues of safety.  
 We work with the Enquête Démographique et de Santé (EDS) collected by 
UNFPA in 2002. This survey has very detailed information on each member of the 
interviewed households, including all births and deaths, schooling and wealth and well as 
the entire migration history during the civil war. We combine these surveys with event 
data on the location and timing of the conflict. The empirical identification strategy 
exploits variation in the onset and duration of conflict across Burundi’s provinces and the 
related variation determining which cohorts of children were exposed to the massacres 
and the civil war during the children’s school aged years.  
 The paper is structured as follows. After a review of the literature on conflict, 
gender, schooling and displacement we discuss the state of the economy in Burundi as 
well as the history of the country’s civil war. We then present the data set that we use and 
proceed with the estimation strategy for schooling. Results are presented in section 5 
followed by a robustness analysis and conclusion. 
 
2. Review of the Literature on schooling, gender and conflict 
While there is a body of research analyzing how households cope with economic 
or agricultural shocks such as crop failures, famines or droughts (Fafchamps, Udry and 
Czukas, 1998; Dercon, 2004), there is not much work on the micro-economic 
consequences of political shocks, be them violent or non-violent. While few households 
have formal insurance against economic shocks, many have a set of informal insurance 
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mechanisms that they can use, like self-insurance (portfolio spread, income 
diversification, temporary migration), village level solidarity mechanisms or even outside 
insurance against weather calamities (Dercon, 2004). Such insurance mechanism appear 
not to be available for political risks. Or, at least, the scholarly community has largely 
failed to study potential coping mechanism for political shocks. One of the findings of the 
coping literature in development economics is that non-poor households are better able to 
cope with negative economic shocks compared to poor households. Using assets, savings 
or their social capital, they succeed better in cushioning the negative impact of weather, 
disease, or price shocks. The scarce but nascent literature on political shocks suggests 
that this poor versus non-poor divide in terms of coping is non-existent or in any case 
much smaller than in the case of economic shocks. In the event of anti-urban/anti-
intellectual conflicts, the non-poor educated part of the population may even be hit harder 
than the poor uneducated part, thereby having completely different effects on their 
welfare in comparison to economic or agricultural shocks.  
Shemyakina (2006) finds from her empirical work in Tajikistan, that girls suffer 
the greater loss in education compared to boys and she attributes this to concerns over 
safety and low returns to girls’ education. In contrast, Akresh and de Walque (2008) find 
that, in Rwanda, it is amongst the male children in non-poor households that violent 
shocks have the strongest effect. Evans and Miguel (2004) find that young children in 
rural Kenya are more likely to drop out of school after the parent’s death and that effect is 
particularly strong for children who lost their mothers. While Kenya was not the scene of 
violent conflict during the observed period, the finding is relevant because violent 
conflict produces many orphans, which may have a similar effect on their schooling. 
Combining a household panel with detailed data on allied bombings of German 
cities during WW II, Akbulut-Yuksel (2009) finds significant, long-lasting detrimental 
effects of bombing on human capital and labour market outcomes of individuals who 
were at school-age during WWII. These individuals had 0.4 fewer years of schooling on 
average in adulthood in comparison to those not affected by the bombings. Affected 
children experienced on average a reduction of 6 percent in labour market earnings in 
relation to those not affected.  Merrouche (2006) arrives at similar results for Cambodia. 
She finds that land mine contamination has caused significant educational losses. A 
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conservative estimate at the mean level of landmine exposure suggests a loss of about 0.4 
years of education. This again represents an educational setback of 11% given a sample 
average number of years of education of about 4.5 years in 1997.  
 Alderman, Hoddinott and Kinsey (2006) find that Zimbabwean children affected 
by the civil war in the 1970s completed less grades of schooling and/or started school 
later than those not affected by the shocks. Similar results are found by Angrist and 
Kugler (2008) and Rodriguez and Sanchez (2009) for Colombia; Chamarbagwala and 
Morán (2009) for Guatemala, de Walque (2006) for Cambodia.  
Next to this loss of educational attainment in general, Justino (2011) observes a 
second pattern in the results of emerging studies, to wit that secondary schooling seems 
to be disproportionally affected. Stewart et al. (2001) find that primary school enrolments 
decreased in only three out of eighteen countries in their sample of countries affected by 
civil wars. Swee (2009) provides evidence on the effects of the civil war in Bosnia (1992-
1995). He finds that individuals in cohorts affected by the civil war are less likely to 
complete secondary schooling if they resided in municipalities which experienced higher 
levels of war intensity. He finds no noticeable effects on primary schooling. 
Reasons of why education during the war may be affected negatively include 
school closure, migration and displacement, quality and availability of school facilities 
and shocks to income and security. Chamarbagwala and Morán (2008) find that 
individuals who were at school age in areas more affected by the war (1979-1984) in 
Guatemala completed fewer years of schooling, and that this effect was stronger for girls. 
The authors find a significant positive correlation between conflict intensity and 
education at low levels of schooling. Girls exposed to the 1979-1984 war during their 
school-age years completed 0.44 years of school (or 12%) less than girls living in 
departments not affected by the fighting. Older female cohorts exposed to the war 
completed 0.64 years (17%) less schooling than those not affected by warfare. The effect 
for males is smaller. Female education continued to lag behind male education 
throughout the country, but especially so in the areas of high war intensity between 1979 
and 1984, almost two decades after the worst conflict outbreak. The study suggests that 
loss of property and massive displacement led households to reallocate limited resources 
towards providing young boys and, to a lesser extent, young girls, with at least some 
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primary education. While both boys and girls received less secondary education as a 
result of the civil war, the effects were more pronounced for girls. Girls in higher grades 
seem to be the main victims. Similarly to Akresh and de Walque (2008), Chamarbagwala 
and Morán find that a lower probability of progressing from one grade to another rather 
than not attaining any education appears to drive the results. 
Tembon and Fort (2008) analyse the importance of girl education for economic 
growth. Justino (2011) observes that children needed to replace labour may be removed 
from school, which may in turn deplete the household of their stock of human capital for 
future generations. Akresh and de Walque (2009), Merrouche (2006), Shemyakina (2006) 
and Swee (2009) point to this mechanism as an explanation for the reduction in 
educational attainment and enrolment observed in contexts of civil war. In a recent paper, 
Rodriguez and Sanchez (2009) test directly the effect of war on child labour and find that 
violent attacks in Colombian municipalities by armed groups have increased significantly 
the probability of school drop-out, and have increased the inclusion of children in the 
labour market. They show that increased mortality risks, negative economic shocks and 
reduction in school quality due to violence are the main channels through which armed 
conflict reduces human capital investments at the household level and increases child 
labour. We add that not only may the young generation be prevented from acquiring 
human capital, educated members of older cohorts may be disproportionally killed, 
thereby depriving the country from its human capital stock.   
 
3. Conflict, the economy and education in Burundi 
The 1990s were a particularly violent decade in Central Africa’s history. Burundi 
and Rwanda experienced several episodes of mass murder and genocide, and the regional 
civil war in the Democratic Republic of Congo created an enormous loss of life and 
socioeconomic destruction. Most of the recent work on Burundi focuses on the causes of 
the latest episode of civil conflict (Nkurunziza and Ngaruko 2000), the progression of the 
crisis (Chrétien and Mukuri 2000), the year-by-year political dimensions of the conflict 
(Reyntjens and Vandeginste 1997; Reyntjens 1998), or the possible solutions to it 
(Ndikumana 2000). 
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Between 1990 and 2002, per capita income in Burundi fell from $210 to $110 
leaving Burundi as the world’s poorest country. The proportion of people living below 
the nationally defined poverty line increased during this period from 35 to 68 percent, 
and the conflict led to double digit inflation rates, which peaked at over 30 percent in 
1997 (all figures from IMF 2007). 
 
3.1 Short Political History of the Conflict2 
Civil conflict in Burundi began in 1965, three years after independence from the Belgian 
colonial administration, when a group of Hutu officers unsuccessfully tried to seize 
power and overthrow the monarchy. This failed coup led to a purge of Hutu from the 
army and government and marked the beginning of political exclusion of the Hutu 
majority by the Tutsi minority. Power became the sole monopoly of the Tutsi, who 
effectively seized power in 1966 and proclaimed the First Republic, headed by Captain 
Michel Micombero. During Micombero’s regime, power was increasingly concentrated 
in the hands of the Tutsi Hima clan, a small ethno-regional group from the southern 
province of Bururi, that the French historian Chrétien (1997) calls the Bururi mafia. 
In 1972, a Hutu insurgency started in southwestern Burundi resulting in 
considerable loss of life among the Tutsi residents. The subsequent Tutsi army repression 
was dramatic. From May to August 1972, all educated Hutus and members of the Hutu 
elite were systematically eliminated or fled into exile (Lemarchand 1994). This massacre 
of educated Hutus reduced their status to an oppressed underclass and reduced future 
Hutu opposition for over a generation. 
The next major confrontation was in 1988, when a Hutu insurgency began in the 
north. As in 1972, army repression was swift and took a heavy toll on local Hutus. 
However, unlike 1972, the international community condemned the massacres and 
pressured the Buyoya regime to liberalize its political system. In June 1993, this led to 
the first free and fair elections in post-independence Burundi. Unfortunately, the 
democratic transition did not last. In October 1993, Melchior Ndadaye, the first 
democratically elected president and a Hutu, was assassinated by Tutsi army elements in 
a failed coup attempt, marking the start of another civil war. As the news spread to the 
                                                 
2 This section relies on Bundervoet, Verwimp, Akresh (2009). 
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rural provinces, Hutu peasants committed large-scale massacres of Tutsis and Uprona 
Hutus. Chrétien (1997) describes the massacres saying districts in certain provinces were 
“almost completely ‘cleansed’ of all Tutsi elements.” Within days, approximately 
100,000 Burundians lost their lives in what was later acknowledged as genocide (United 
Nations 1996). The Tutsi army retaliated against the Hutus, continuing what would 
become the most severe civil war in Burundi’s history, both in terms of human lives and 
socioeconomic destruction. Unlike prior wars that began with a localized Hutu 
insurgency followed by severe but random Tutsi army reprisals, this crisis was a more 
traditional war, with two opposing armed and organized factions and an impact on almost 
the entire country (Ndikumana 2000). 
 
3.2  Spatial and Temporal Intensity of the Conflict 
In this paper we use the term violent conflict to describe the massacres that 
occurred in the 1993-1994 period as well as the subsequent civil war in the 1995-2005 
period. As the exact timing and location of the massacres and the civil war plays an 
important role for our identification strategy (see below), we describe the evolution of the 
massacres and the civil war through time and space as follows:  
 
• 1993 and 1994: massacres in many parts of the country but with different intensities 
• End of 1994 to July 1996: Spread of civil war throughout the country (see Figure 1) 
• July 1996 to August 2000: Return of Major Buyoya to power after a bloodless coup. 
Lower civil war intensity in most provinces and signing of the Arusha Peace and 
Reconciliation Agreement in 2000. 
 
The massacres were particularly intense in central and northern Burundi.  Bundervoet 
(2009) estimates that in half of the provinces more than 7% of individuals interviewed in 
the UNFPA survey (see below) lost their father in 1993. Table 5 gives the data per 
province and sketches the evolution of the civil war based on Chrétien and Mukuri 
(2000). Fighting began in October 1994 in the northwestern provinces of Cibitoke, 
Bubanza, Bujumbura Rural and Ngozi. By early 1995, violence spread to the bordering 
Kayanza province, and by April 1995, massacres of civilians and confrontations between 
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army and rebel forces happened in Karuzi, Bururi, Ruyigi and Muyinga. By late 1995, 
fighting took place in the central provinces of Gitega and Muramvya and the northern 
province of Kirundo. Figure 1 depicts the situation at the end of 1995. By then, conflict 
had spread to almost all of the provinces of Burundi, with the exception of Cankuzo (in 
the east of the country) and Rutana and Makamba (in the south of the country). In July 
1996, former president Buyoya seized power again in a bloodless coup d’état backed by 
the army. During late 1996 and early 1997, armed conflict continued in Kayanza, 
Muramvya, Kirundo and Gitega. Meanwhile in April 1997, the Arusha Peace talks 
between the principal conflict parties began. As of late 1997, insecurity increased again 
in Cibitoke, Bubanza and Bujumbura Rural, provinces which remained unsafe until 1999.  
The various conflict accounts provide no definitive explanation for why the 
massacres and the civil war affected some provinces earlier than others. However, the 
conflict’s spread was clearly influenced by the rebel base locations in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo’s North Kivu region next to the borders of Cibitoke, Bubanza, and 
Bujumbura Rural, which explains why these provinces were first to experience war. The 
presence of the Kibira forest bordering these provinces could explain the subsequent 
spread of war to Kayanza and Ngozi, since rebels passed undetected through the forest. 
From these initial conflict provinces, the war spread to the rest of the country. 
 
3.3. Civilian Impacts of the Conflict 
According to Human Rights Watch (1998), the civil war in Burundi “has above 
all been a war against civilians.” They were widely used as proxy targets, with both sides 
targeting civilians deemed supportive of the other group. Between 1994 and 2001, an 
estimated 200,000 people lost their lives in the war, a majority of them civilians (UNFPA 
2002). To understand how the war affected child schooling, we focus on displacement, 
looting of household assets, and the theft and burning of crops.3 
First, the demographic household survey conducted by the United Nations 
Population Fund (UNFPA), which we use in this paper, found over 50 percent of the rural 
Burundi population had been displaced from their homes at least once between 1993 and 
                                                 
3 For an analysis of the health consequences of the civil war in Burundi, we refer to Akresh et al (2009), 
Health and Civil War in Rural Burundi, Journal of Human Resources, 44, 2, p.536-563. 
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2000 due to violence (UNFPA 2002). The average displacement duration for the entire 
sample was just over one year, meaning three agricultural seasons were missed as 
households could not cultivate or harvest their fields while displaced (UNFPA 2002). 
Displacement also meant individuals were more likely to contract water and vector-borne 
diseases while hiding in the forest. As people could not carry significant amounts of food 
when fleeing their village, adequate nutrition was a problem. Finally, displacement also 
implied a lack of access to markets, health clinics or schools as roads were unsafe or 
these structures had been damaged. Later in the war, civilians were forced into local 
resettlement camps by the government and camp conditions were poor, being 
overcrowded and with a lack of food supplies, clean water, or waste disposal (HRW 
2000). The displacement’s impact on aggregate production from 1993 to 1998 showed 
production declines in cereals of 15 percent, roots and tubers 11 percent, and fruits and 
vegetables 14 percent, with particularly dramatic declines in 1994 and 1995 (FAO 1997). 
Later on in the paper we will test the impact of displacement on schooling as a potential 
channel by which exposure to violent conflict can affect child schooling. 
We add that when conflict ended in a given province, households who were 
displaced could and did return to their homes and fields. However, humanitarian 
interventions by either the government or non-governmental organizations (NGO) after 
the fighting ended were practically nonexistent, due to the continued insecurity on all 
roads linking the capital, Bujumbura, to the countryside. By early 1995, rebels groups 
had begun to target and kill foreign NGO workers and journalists who left Bujumbura to 
visit war regions. Moreover, international development assistance dropped sharply during 
the crisis, from almost $320 million before 1993 to below $100 million in 1999 (IMF 
2007). 
Second, besides the displacement and killing of civilians, both rebel and 
government forces engaged in the looting of civilian property, in particular livestock, 
causing an unprecedented drop in household welfare levels. Aggregate national figures 
show the number of tropical livestock units in the country declined by 23 percent from 
1990 to 1998, a decline that is predominantly due to theft and pillaging (FAO 1997). At 
the household level, the results of the UNFPA survey show that the average number of 
tropical livestock units per household fell from 2.37 before the crisis to 0.42 in 2001 
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(UNFPA 2002). In the regression analysis below the size of livestock before the start of 
the conflict will be used as an indicator of pre-conflict wealth. Luckily, these 
retrospective questions were asked in the 2002 survey. Given its importance in rural 
Burundi we are confident that people are able to remember how may cows and other 
animals they possessed at the start of the conflict. 
Third, Human Rights Watch reports (1998) document the theft and burning of 
household crops. Crops were stolen from the field or granaries and coffee trees were 
particularly targeted for burning. As coffee is the government’s main source of tax 
revenue, rebels frequently burnt coffee plantations to reduce government revenue, 
although we cannot quantify the extent of this. Coffee is also an important source of 
income for small farmers, so by losing their crop, farmers had less income to pay for 
other expenditures, including purchasing food crops, school fees or health care. The 
UNFPA survey however has no data on theft or burning of crops. 
Fourth, the conflict in Burundi is notorious for its adverse impacts on women and 
girls. Rape was widespread and there have been many instances of brutality, even against 
children. Note, on the other hand, that Burundi also had a female prime minister during 
the conflict and other women have been gaining prominence in Burundese society.  
 
3.4 Education and Conflict in Burundi 
Access to education, in particular secondary and university education has been a 
long-standing source of inequality, tension and conflict. This is because it is directly 
related to jobs in the public sector who demand a formal degree.  The education system 
together with jobs in the administration was dominated by Tutsi from the southern region 
of Bururi. Nkurunziza and Ngaruko (2002) write that in 1972 almost all educated Hutus 
were killed by the Tutsi army. Education was clearly a liability then.  
In a new report on education and violent conflict UNESCO (2011, p.51) 
calculates that the onset of conflict in Burundi marked an abrupt change in enrolment. 
The decade before the conflict (1981-1991) oversaw an expansion of enrolment for each 
new cohort, male as well as female.  The gross enrolment rate increased from 33.2 to 70 
in that decade (Ministry of Education, 1999). The conflict-induced trend reversal can be 
observed from Figure 2 which we computed with the UNFPA data: the older birth 
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cohorts (who could finish primary schooling before the start of the conflict) show an 
upward trend in primary school completion. The cohorts born between 1975 and 1980 
show the highest primary school completion rates in the history of Burundi (up to 2010). 
This was dues to the expansion of primary education which doubled the enrolment rate in 
five years (1982-1987) (UNESCO 1999; UNICEF, 2008). Progress stops for the birth 
cohorts born at the end of the seventies and is reversed from the 1980 birth cohorts 
onwards, just when the first birth cohorts are confronted with the start of the violence. 
Children in Burundi attend primary school from age 7 to 12 when they finish 6th grade 
(UNESCO Institute for Statistics, January 2008). Some children may start schooling later 
and complete primary schooling at later age. Figures 3 and 4 demonstrate the decrease in 
primary school completion per number of years of exposure to conflict for boys and girls. 
In an extensive review of the damage done to the education sector during the 
conflict in Burundi, Obura (2008) observes that schools were destroyed or looted and 
teachers and children killed or displaced. Importantly, while the gross enrolment rate 
decreased, the Gender Parity Index did not decline during the conflict and even improved 
slightly (see tables 1 and 2). Obura also remarks that a church-led education initiative, 
called Yaga Mukama, that existed before the war and provided two days of primary 
school level education per week to the rural poor, became very popular during the war 
and even acted as a sort of substitute for formal education in affected areas.  
 
4.Data and Estimation Strategy 
4.1 Conflict variables  
In 2002, UNFPA collected demographic and health data (EDS) on almost 7,000 
households. Descriptive data are presented in tables 3 and 4. Since many Burundese lived 
in camps for internally displaced persons, a particular feature of this survey is that it is 
stratified over urban, rural and camp locations. The focus of the survey was on household 
composition, schooling and health with a lot of attention for the potential impact of the 
conflict through displacement.  In order to determine who was affected by the massacres 
and the civil war at school-age, we use two sources. For the massacres we rely on 
Bundervoet (2009) who computed the percentage of people in the 2002 UNFPA survey 
(EDS) whose father was killed. He applied the method proposed by Gakidou and King 
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(2006) to correct for selection bias resulting from the absence from the survey of 
households where everyone was killed. Using that estimate (reproduced in Table 5) we 
have eight provinces with a death rate higher than the median death rate (7%) and eight 
provinces with a lower death rate. We define the high mortality provinces as the area 
(heavily) affected by the massacres and the low mortality area as the non-affected area. 
For exposure to the civil war, we rely on Chrétien and Mukuri (2000) referred to 
in section (3.2) who describe the spread of the violence over space and time. This allows 
us to construct an exposure variable on birth cohort – province level basis. We also use 
the UNFPA data to construct to alternative conflict variables at the individual level (see 
robustness analysis), to wit the number of times the person was forcibly displaced and the 
duration of stay in a displacement camp. In summary, we have three conflict exposure 
variables: 
(i) the length of exposure to violent conflict. This is the number of years the child 
was exposed to massacres and to the civil war measured at the birth cohort – 
province level. For example: a child born in 1985 and residing in the province of 
Karuzi was affected 4 years during its school-age years, being the sum of 2 years 
(1993 and 1994) because of the location of massacres in this province and 2 years 
(1995 and 1996) because of the spread of civil war into Karuzi in these years. 
(ii) The number of times the child had to move residence forcibly during the  
massacres and the civil war; 
(iii)      The number of years the child spent in a displacement camp, again at primary  
school-age. We believe that this is the more relevant indicator compared to  
residence in a displacement camp at the time of the survey. 
 
Many children born in the 1981-1986 period have experienced at least one year of 
conflict during their primary school career. The oldest, born in 1981 was about to 
graduate from primary school when the conflict started. Not all of these children are 
affected however. Some provinces were not affected by the civil war (Cankuzo and 
Rutana) and we defined half of the provinces with low mortality resulting from the 1993 
massacres as being not affected by those massacres. Children born before 1981 had the 
chance to finish their primary schooling before the start of the conflict and we define 
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these older cohorts as being not affected. Since we do not know the exact year or the 
exact age at which a child finished her primary schooling, we cannot lengthen the 
exposure time beyond age 12: as exposure is measured on a year of birth – province level 
basis we would wrongly consider a child affected at age 13 in a given province when in 
effect she may have completed her primary schooling the year before. So the maximum 
duration of exposure is six years. Using the method just described we do not find children 
exposed for more than four years in our sample.  
 
4.2 .Empirical Specifications 
Our basic approach is a difference-in-differences strategy. We use the spatial and 
temporal variation of violent conflict in Burundi to infer the effect of exposure on child 
schooling. We compare children who were exposed to several years of conflict in their 
area of residence during their school-aged years with children of the same age residing in 
areas who were not much affected, as well as with children who were old enough to 
finish their schooling before the conflict started in both heavily affected and not much 
affected areas.  
   Building on Figure 2 and previous tabulations, we first estimate the following 
baseline province and birth cohort fixed effects regressions: 
 
( ) ijtjttjijt ExposureovinceConflictSchooling εβδα +++= *Pr1      (1) 
 
where Schooling is our education variable, which in our case is a binary variable for 
having completed primary school or not, measured for a child i residing in area j and born 
at time t. With αj the area fixed effects, δt the birth cohort fixed effects and εijt is a random 
error term.  We calculate the Conflict Provincet *Exposurej variable first as a binary 
measure to indicate a child residing in a province that experienced violent conflict and 
second, as a continuous measure to indicate the duration (in years) of exposure for a child 
residing in an affected province. In the latter case, β1, the coefficient of interest, measures 
the impact on schooling of an additional year of exposure to violent conflict. Including all 
provinces allows us to use variation in onset as well as the duration of conflict across 
provinces to identify the war’s causal impact on children’s schooling.   
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4.3 The Gender differential 
 
ijtjtii
jitjijt
ExposureovinceConflictSS
ExposureSSchooling
εββ
βδα
++
+++=
)*Pr  *(                                          
)*Province(Conflict )*(
32
t1
               (2) 
 
Whereby Si is the sex of the child and the other variables are as in specification (1). In 
this specification β1 variable gives the effect of violent conflict on schooling for boys. 
The interaction effect between gender and conflict tells us whether or not there is an 
additional effect for girls and the linear combination of β2 and β3 gives the total effect of 
conflict on schooling for girls. One of the specifications in the empirical part will control 
for gender specific time trends. 
 
4.4 Expansion of the baseline – Channels of Impact 
Apart from the conflict measure used in (1) and (2), being the binary conflict exposure 
variable and the number of years of exposure to conflict in the area of residence during 
primary school age, we employ other variables to give us more insight in the potential 
channel by which violent conflict impacts child schooling. We therefore develop other 
specifications where we use alternative measures of conflict indicating a specific 
mechanism.  
     
( ) ijtijtjijt ZExposureChannelSchooling εγβδα ++++= *1              (3) 
 
The channels are the time spent in a displacement camp during school age and the 
number of times the child moved residence during school age. In the above specification 
we have introduced characteristics that are specific to the household in which the child 
lives. Importantly and to avoid endogeneity, these household level characteristics are 
measured in 1993, i.e. before the start of the conflict. Where Z is a vector of child specific 
characteristics such as the age, sex, level of education of the head of the household and 
the wealth of the household. 
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5. Issues of concern to the identification strategy: poverty, selective survival and 
    selective migration 
A first issue of concern for our estimation strategy is that we may measure the 
effect of something else than exposure to civil war. If, for example, the war lasted longer 
in poor provinces or if it did not affect relatively well-off provinces, than we may be 
measuring the effect of poverty in stead of exposure to civil war. While we do control for 
wealth (under the form of livestock) in our regression analysis, this variable is measured 
at the household level. Since our exposure variable is measured at the province level, we 
have to make sure we are not picking up another effect. To that effect, in table A1 in the 
appendix, we present data on the death rate in 1993 and the duration of the civil war in 
poor and non-poor provinces. Poverty is measured prior to the start of the massacres and 
the war. There is no statistically significant difference in the death rate or the duration of 
the civil war in poor versus non-poor provinces. While more people were killed in poor 
provinces, the war actually lasted longer in the non-poor provinces. We conclude from 
this that there seems not to be selection into violence of the poorer provinces. It seems 
therefore unlikely that our exposure variable is picking up a wealth effect. 
A second issue is potential bias caused by selective survival. As the survey by 
definition only has data on children who survived the violence up to the time of the 
survey, we need to account for potential survivor bias in the sample. More in particular, 
when death during the conflict was not a random event, we may over or underestimate 
the effects of the conflict on schooling, depending on the direction of the bias. The debate 
on the selectivity of violence in Burundi is ongoing. Recent empirical work (Bundervoet, 
2009) on the one hand shows that parents of educated children were more likely to be 
killed in the 1993 massacre. On the other hand Voors et al (2010) show that the profile of 
migrants leaving conflict-affected areas is not much different from non-migrants, thereby 
reducing the potential bias based on survey data collected in those villages after the civil 
war. 
The findings in Bundervoet (2009) mean that the effect of violent conflict on 
schooling was not limited to children who are at school-age during the conflict, but also 
affected those children who already completed their primary education. Education in 
times of conflict in Burundi has proven to be a liability. Following Bundervoet (2009) 
this would mean that our non-affected cohort suffers survival bias in which the most 
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educated cohort members are killed in 1993. This would also mean that on average this 
cohort was more educated than we infer from the survivors in the 2002 survey. Assuming 
the there is no such survival bias for the affected cohort (as is likely because in 1993 they 
were too young to be targeted) the negative effect that we find for the affected cohort 
would be an underestimate of the true effect. We investigate the claim below. 
Next to selective killing we may also face a problem of selective migration. If 
migrants have another profile then stayers, then we may over-or underestimate the impact 
of violent conflict on the stayers. We thus need to address two potential threats: (i) people 
killed in the 1993 massacres and the subsequent civil war may have had a different 
profile than survivors; (ii) people who have migrated since 1993 may have a different 
profile than those who did not migrate. The latter issue can be divided in three categories 
of migrants. (ii.a) Those who were internally displaced, (ii.b) those we were refugees and 
who returned to Burundi before 2002 and (ii.c) those we went abroad but did not return 
before 2002.  
 People in categories (ii.a) and (ii.b) are included in the sample. As mentioned 
above, one of the strengths of the survey design in 2002 was that it also surveyed people 
living in displacement camps. In this way the survey design captures the internally 
displaced and there is no danger for not being selected in the survey. People who fled 
abroad but returned before 2002 are also captured, because they are part of the target 
population at the time of the design of the survey. This means that only groups (i) and 
(ii.c) represent a potential selection problem.  
 The 2002 survey allows us to investigate the profile of people who were killed as 
well as that of migrants. Each surveyed household was asked to report on the death of a 
father, mother, husband, spouse or child and also report the cause of death (the latter not 
for husband or wives however). Each household was also asked to report the migration 
history of each member since the start of the conflict. 
 Table A2 in Appendix compares the profiles of households with and without at 
least one child that was killed in the 1993-2002 period. We do this for the loss of boys as 
well as girls. Table A3 does the same with widowed persons. We find that parents who 
lost at least one daughter in the violence were less educated compared to parents who did 
not loose a daughter. Inferring from this that the killed daughters are more educated than 
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the survived ones is premature given that the siblings (above age 15) of the deceased girls 
have a higher probability to complete primary education. The finding remains 
inconclusive for two other reasons: the low number of girls killed and the fact that we 
only dispose of the education data for siblings who still live in the parental home at the 
time of the survey. We do not find significant differences between the profiles of parents 
and siblings with and without at least one son killed. As to the death of husbands/spouses, 
we find a difference in the pre-war level of livestock ownership. Households where the 
husband died in the 1993-2002 period had significantly more livestock than households 
where the husband was alive at the time of the survey. Our findings are not at odds with 
those of Bundervoet (2009). First, he also finds a higher level of pre-war livestock among 
households with members killed and second his finding was based on the observation that 
fathers who were killed had more educated children, while we are interested in the level 
of education of the deceased children, not of the fathers. A large part of the latter (and 
thus of Bundervoet’s assertion) are born before 1970, a cohort that is not relevant for this 
paper. 
Given that we only computed the profiles of parents, siblings or husband/wives of 
people who where born between 1970 and 1987, and given that most of the findings in 
Tables A2 and A3 are not very conclusive or point in one clear direction, we conclude 
that selection bias caused by non-random killings in unlikely to bias our estimates in one 
or the other direction. 
 The same conclusion can be drawn from Table A4 for the case of the migrants. 
Since we do not have data on migrants who did not return to Burundi at the time of the 
survey we try to obtain a profile by proxy. The closest we can come to these long term 
refugees not registered in the 2002 survey is by taking the profile of those refugees who 
were abroad for several years and then returned to Burundi. As one can see from Table 
A4, compared to the stayers, these longer term refugees were slightly older, a little less 
female and had more educated heads of households. To the extent that the migrants who 
did not return have a comparable level of education as their heads of households (which 
is not necessarily the case, see Table A4) and given their age (23 on average), they would 
have increased the percentage that completed primary schooling in the non-affected 
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cohort (born between 1970 and 1981). This means that the estimates we find for the 
cohorts affected by the violence are an underestimate of the true effect. 
 
6. Results 
In table 6 we use the binary shock exposure variable that takes the value of 1 for children 
exposed to violent conflict in their province of residence during their school age years 
and 0 for non-exposed individuals. This regression in the first column controls for linear 
age effects and province fixed effects. We find that the coefficient of our variable of 
interest (exposure the violent conflict) is -0.89 which, in a logistic regression framework 
corresponds to an odds ratio of 0.40. This means that the odds to complete primary 
schooling are 60% lower for children exposed to violence. The second column of Table 6 
adds the gender variable and interacts it with exposure to violent conflict. We find that 
the coefficient for exposure to violence decreases to -1.07 which corresponds to an odds 
ratio of 0.34. This means that the odds for boys who are exposed to violent conflict are 
66% lower compared to non-exposed boys. The pure gender effect is negative: the 
coefficient of the gender variable is -0.52 which corresponds to an odds ratio of 0.59, 
meaning that the odds of girls to complete primary schooling are 41% lower than for 
boys. The coefficient of the interaction variable between gender and exposure to violent 
conflict is statistically insignificant, which means that there is no additional effect on 
primary school completion for girls exposed to the conflict. In order to calculate the 
decrease in the odds to complete primary schooling for girls who were exposed to violent 
conflict we take the linear combination of the estimates for exposure to violence and the 
gender*exposure interaction variable, yielding a coefficient of 0.82 [0.19] which is 
statistically significant at the 1% level. This corresponds to an odds ratio of 0.44 which 
means that the odds of girls exposed to conflict to complete primary schooling are 56% 
lower compared to girls not exposed to conflict.  
Results remain the same in column three where livestock ownership before the 
start of the conflict is introduced as an additional regressor. In column four we consider 
that observations made for members of the same household or not independent from one 
another. We use household random effects to test for differences within and between 
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households. Girls are now worse off, but this is a pure gender effect, not an effect of 
exposure to conflict. 
  Using population weights and clustering at the province level in the regression to 
obtain robust standard errors does not change the results: the level of statistical 
significance of the estimators remains at 1%. We do not apply the latter two in the 
remaining regressions because STATA does not accept population weights in random 
effects regressions neither can we combine household random effects with clustering. For 
reasons of parsimony of presentation we do not present clustered regressions in Table 6. 
 In the first two columns of Table 7 we perform the analysis separately for poor 
and non-poor individuals. Boys and girls from poor as well as non-poor households suffer 
from conflict with the coefficient for poor girls (linear combination of exposure and 
gender*exposure) -0.89*** the same as for poor boys. This corresponds to an odds ratio 
of 0.40 meaning that the odds for girls and boys from poor households to complete 
primary schooling is 60% lower compared to non-exposed children from poor 
households. For children from non-poor households the gender difference is more 
pronounced. The coefficient for boys is -1.3 corresponding to an odds ratio of 0.27 
meaning a 73% decrease in the odds to complete primary schooling. For girls, the gender-
exposure interaction is positive and statistically significant, meaning that they do better 
than the boys. The effect of the conflict on the odds of girls from non-poor households 
can then be computed using a linear combination of the exposure and the interaction 
variable which yields on odds ratio of 0.56 and which means that the odds of the girls 
from non-poor households exposed to violent conflict to complete primary schooling are 
44% lower compared to non-exposed girls from non-poor households. This means that 
between the four groups, the schooling of boys from non-poor households suffers the 
most from conflict exposure and the schooling of girls from non-poor households the 
least. The pure gender effect remains negative for poor as well as non-poor girls.  
Moving to the years of exposure as our variable of interest in columns 3 and 4, the 
magnitude of the coefficients is about half compared to the binary case and the levels of 
statistical significance remain the same, for boys as well as for girls. Of course, the 
magnitude now has to interpreted in a continuous way, not a binary way, meaning that 
the odds to complete primary schooling decline with 56% for every additional year of 
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exposure (column 3) and with 24% when we control for birth cohort fixed effects and 
gender specific time trend as well as household random effects (column 4). The estimates 
remain statistically significant at the 5% level for boys, but the linear combination of the 
exposure and the exposure*gender variable (a decline in the odds to complete primary 
schooling by 11%) is not any longer significant at conventional levels. The pure gender 
effect however is negative, its magnitude large and significant at the 1% level. This 
means that, after controlling for gender specific time trends as well household random 
effects (admittedly a severe test), only the schooling of boys seems to suffer from 
exposure to violent conflict. Dividing the sample in poor and non-poor households yields 
the result that only the schooling of boys from non-poor households is negatively affected 
by exposure to conflict at conventional levels of statistical significance (results not 
shown). 
In Table 8 we limit the sample to sons and daughters living with their parents at 
the time of the survey. This allows us to control for additional household characteristics 
dating from just before the conflict. We control for the education, the gender and the age 
of the head of the household. In addition we test for the loss of at least one parent in 
1993. Results for our variable of interest confirm the results of tables 4 and 5, with 
similar magnitudes depending on specification. We also find that the education of the 
head as well as a female head positively affects the probability to complete primary 
schooling. The dead of one or both parents has no statistically significant effect. This may 
have to do with the policy to abolish school fees for orphans of the 1993 massacres. 
When we distinguish between poor and non-poor we find again that daughters from non-
poor households seem to suffer the least and boys from non-poor households the most. 
Thus, while there is no difference between the magnitude of the effect of exposure for 
sons and daughters in poor households, it is twice as large for sons in non-poor 
households compared to daughters. 
Exposure to violent conflict remains somewhat a broad term, defined at the 
province-birth cohort level. From such definition we cannot derive the exact channel by 
which the education of children at school age is affected during conflict. Possible 
channels are the destruction of school buildings or insecurity that makes parents keep 
children at home. One possible channel that affected almost one out of three households 
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in Burundi during the war was forced displacement. Our data allow us to test this channel 
in two ways. The survey has registered the number of times that each household member 
had to move residence because of the fighting and also the length of stay in a 
displacement camp. It seems plausible that both would have a negative effect on the 
probability of a child at school age to complete its primary schooling. Columns 1-3 in 
table 9 test these two channels. We find that it is the frequency of forced displacement 
that matters, not the length of stay in a displacement camp. Being uprooted from one’s 
village because of ongoing or imminent violence proofs to be disruptive for one’s school 
career to the extent that it decreases the probability to complete primary schooling, in 
particular when it happens several times. The length of one’s stay in a displacement camp 
is not statistically significant, which may have to do with the supply of schooling in such 
camps. When we test the effect of the three channels of violence (exposure to battles, 
forced displacement and duration of stay), it are the first two that exercise a negative and 
statistically significant effect on the completion of primary schooling. The odds to 
complete primary schooling decline by 16% for every additional year of exposure and 
with 21% for every instance of forced displacement. 
Finally in column 4 of table 9 we perform of robustness check in which we have 
left out the 1978-1982 birth cohorts from the analysis. The argument can be made that we 
are not sure whether or not these birth cohorts are affected by the violence. One could for 
example argue that some pupils are still in primary school when they are 13, 14 or 15 
years old, in which case the older birth cohorts would also be affected by the massacres 
and the civil war towards the end of their primary school career. If that would be the case 
then they would not constitute an adequate control group. Valente (2011) in her paper on 
the schooling consequences of the conflict in Nepal makes a similar argument to drop a 
few birth cohorts from her analysis. In column 4 of table 9 we thus infer the effects of 
violent conflict on affected cohorts where we are certain that the control group never 
experienced violence during their school careers and the treated group does. The result, 
with province fixed effects, gender specific time trends as well as household random 
effects is very similar to the one obtained in column 4 of table 7 (-0.23 versus -0.27). 
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7. Conclusion 
Large scale massacres and civil war have a detrimental effect on the schooling of 
survivors. This means that, in addition the obvious negative effects of violent conflict 
such as the destruction of lives and infrastructure comes the long term negative effect 
under the form of diminished human capital. This moves a country into a lower 
development trajectory for the longer run.  
 There is no universal theory that allows us to predict the direction of the gender 
effect of violent conflict on schooling. In peace-time girls in Burundi are less likely to 
complete primary schooling compared to boys. This negative gender effect, irrespective 
of violent conflict, is a robust finding in all our specifications. The question whether or 
not there is an additional gender effect on schooling as a result of violent conflict depends 
on the specification. In most specifications we find that the schooling of boys as well as 
girls is negatively affected by the conflict. This means that there is no additional gender 
effect of the violence. The magnitude of the effect however is larger for boys. This is 
confirmed in a specification which includes gender and birth cohort fixed effects as well 
as gender specific time trends. Controlling for all these effects makes the 
gender*violence interaction term as well as the linear combination of the exposure to 
violence and the gender*violence interaction term statistically insignificant, meaning that 
we only observe an effect on schooling for boys. Thus is in accordance with the 
observations in Obura (2008) where she presents declining gross enrolment rates during 
the civil war, but a stable and even slightly increasing Gender Parity Index. 
 When the sample is split between poor and non-poor households, the results 
reported above become even more pronounced. Boys from poor as well as non-poor 
households suffer, but the magnitude of the loss is larger for boys from non-poor 
households. In summary, it seems that in rural Burundi, the schooling of boys from non-
poor households seems to be affected most, followed by boys and girls from poor 
households (with an effect of about the same magnitude) and lastly, girls from non-poor 
households.  
 Policymakers should consider that conflict shocks have different distributional 
consequences than the better known economic or climatic shocks. Where price 
fluctuations or rain level variability is known to affect the poorest part of the population 
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much more than the non-poor part, this is not the case in the event of shocks of a political 
nature such as massacres or civil war. This paper demonstrates that groups considered to 
be the least vulnerable in the development economics literature – boys from non-poor 
households – are most affected by violent conflict. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
25 
 
References 
 
Akbulut-Yuksel, M., 2009. “"Children of War: The Long-Run Effects of Large Scale 
Physical Destruction and Warfare on Children", IZA Discussion Paper No.4407 
Akresh, Richard, Philip Verwimp, and Tom Bundervoet. 2011. “Civil War, Crop Failure, 
and Child Stunting in Rwanda, Economic Development and Cultural Change, 
vol.59, n.4, pp.777-810 
Alderman, Harold, Jere Behrman, Victor Lavy, and Rekha Menon. 2001. “Child Health  
and School Enrollment: A Longitudinal Analysis.” Journal of Human Resources 
36(1):185-205. 
Alderman, Harold, John Hoddinott, and Bill Kinsey. 2006. “Long Term Consequences of 
Early Childhood Malnutrition.”  Oxford Economic Papers 58(3):450-474. 
Almond, David. 2006. “Is the 1919 Influenza Pandemic Over? Long-Term Effects of In 
Utero Influenza Exposure in the Post-1940 U.S. Population.” Journal of Political 
Economy 114(4):672-712. 
Angrist, Joshua. 1990. “Lifetime Earnings and the Vietnam Era Draft Lottery: Evidence 
from Social Security Administrative Records.” American Economic Review 
80(3):313-336 
Angrist and Kugler. 2008. “ Rural Windfall or a new Resource Curse? Coca, income and 
Civil Conflict in Colombia, the Review of Economics and Statistics”, vol. XC, 
May, n.2, pp.191-215 
Appleton, Simon. 2001. “Education, Incomes and Poverty in Uganda in the 1990s.” 
CREDIT Research Paper No. 01/22. 
Banerjee, Abhijit, Esther Duflo, Gilles Postel-Vinay, and Timothy Watts. 2007. “Long 
Run Health Impacts of Income Shocks: Wine and Phylloxera in 19th Century 
France.” NBER Working Paper No. 12895. 
Bhalotra. Sonia and Arthur van Soest, 2008. Birth-Spacing, fertility and neonatal 
mortality in India: Dynamics, frailty and fecundity, Journal of Econometrics 143, 
274-290 
Bellows, John, and Edward Miguel. 2006. “War and Local Collective Action in Sierra 
Leone.” University of California, Berkeley. Unpublished. 
26 
 
Bertrand, Marianne, Esther Duflo, and Sendhil Mullainathan. 2004. “How Much Should 
We Trust Difference-in-Differences Estimates?” Quarterly Journal of Economics 
119(1): 249-275. 
Blattman, Christopher, and Jeannie Annan. 2007. “The Consequences of Child 
Soldiering.” Households in Conflict Network Working Paper No. 22. 
Brakman, Steven, Harry Garretsen, and Marc Schramm. 2004. “The Strategic Bombing 
of German Cities During World War II and Its Impact on City Growth.” Journal 
of Economic Geography 4(2): 201-218. 
Bundervoet, Tom. 2006. “Estimating Poverty in Burundi.” Households in Conflict 
Network Working Paper No. 20. 
Bundervoet, Tom, Philip Verwimp and Richard Akresh. 2009. “Health and Civil War in 
Rural Burundi, Journal of Human Resources”, 44, 2, p.536-563. 
Chamarbagwala R., and H. Moran. 2010. “The Human Capital Consequences of Civil 
War: Evidence from Guatemala,” Journal of Development Economics. 
forthcoming. 
Chrétien, Jean-Pierre. 1997.  Le Défi de l’Ethnisme: Rwanda et Burundi: 1990-1996. 
Karthala. Paris. 
Chrétien, Jean-Pierre, and Melchior Mukuri. 2000. Burundi, la Fracture Identitaire. 
Logiques de Violence et Certitudes ‘Ethniques’, (1993-1996). Karthala. Paris. 
Collier, Paul, and Anke Hoeffler. 1998. “On the Economic Causes of Civil War.” Oxford 
Economic Papers 50(4): 563-573. 
Dasgupta, Monica and Li Shuzhuo, 1999, Gender-bias in China, the Republic of Korea 
and India, 1920-1990: Effects of war, famine and fertility decline, Policy 
Research Working Paper 2140, the World Bank, 39p. 
Davis, Donald, and David Weinstein. 2002. “Bones, Bombs, and Break Points: The 
Geography of Economic Activity.” American Economic Review 92(5): 1269-
1289. 
Dercon, Stefan, 2004. Growth and Shocks: evidence from Rural Ethiopia", Journal of 
Development Economics, August, vol 74 (2), pp. 309-29.  
Dercon, Stefan, 2004, Insurance against Poverty, edited volume, Oxford University 
Press, 445 pages 
27 
 
Doctors Without Borders. 2004. Access to Health Care in Burundi. Brussels. 
Duflo, Esther. 2003. “Grandmothers and Granddaughters: Old Age Pensions and Intra-
household Allocation in South Africa.” World Bank Economic Review 17(1):1-25. 
Fafchamps, Marcel, Chris Udry and Katherine Czukas, 1998, Drought and Saving in 
West Africa: Are Livestock a Buffer Stock?, Journal of Development Economics,  
 volume 55, Issue 2, pp.273-305 
Friedman, Debra, Michael Hechter, and Satoshi Kanazawa. 1994. " A theory of the value 
of children," Demography 31(3): 375-401. 
Gakidou E, King G. 2006. “Death by survey: estimating adult mortality without selection 
bias from sibling survival data”, Demography, 43(3):569-85 
Ghobarah, Hazem, Paul Huth, and Bruce Russett. 2003. “Civil Wars Kill and Maim 
People Long After the Shooting Stops.” American Political Science Review 
97(2):189–202. 
Gleditsch, Nils, Peter Wallensteen, Mikael Eriksson, Margareta Sollenberg, and Havard 
Strand.  2002. “Armed Conflict 1946-2001: A New Dataset.” Journal of Peace 
Research 39(5): 615-637. 
Guidolin, Massimo, and Eliana La Ferrara. 2007. “Diamonds are Forever, Wars Are Not: 
Is Conflict Bad for Private Firms?” American Economic Review 97(5):1978-1993. 
Human Rights Watch. 1998. Proxy Targets: Civilians in the War in Burundi. New York: 
Human Rights Watch. 
Human Rights Watch. 1999. Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda. New 
York: Human Rights Watch. 
Human Rights Watch. 2000. Emptying the Hills: Resettlement Camps in Burundi. New 
York: Human Rights Watch. 
Imbens, Guido, and Wilbert van der Klaauw. 1995. “Evaluating the Cost of Conscription 
in The Netherlands.” Journal of Business and Economic Statistics 13(2): 207-215. 
IMF. 2007. Burundi: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper. IMF Country Report No. 07/46. 
Washington D.C.: International Monetary Fund. 
Justino, Patricia. 2011. “Violent Conflict and Human Capital Accumulation”, in Graham 
 Brown and Arnim Langer (eds.), Elgar Companion to Civil War and Fragile 
 States. Forthcoming. 
28 
 
Kazianga, Harounan, and Christopher Udry. 2006. “Consumption Smoothing? Livestock, 
Insurance and Drought in Rural Burkina Faso.” Journal of Development 
Economics 79(2): 413-446. 
Lemarchand, René. 1994. Burundi: Ethnocide as Discourse and Practice. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Maccini, Sharon, and Dean Yang. 2006. “Under the Weather: Health, Schooling, and 
Socioeconomic Consequences of Early-Life Rainfall.” University of Michigan. 
Unpublished. 
Martorell, Reynaldo. 1999. “The Nature of Child Malnutrition and Its Long-Term 
Implications.” Food and Nutrition Bulletin 20(3): 288-292. 
Martorell, Reynaldo, and Jean-Pierre Habicht. 1986. “Growth in Early Childhood in 
Developing Countries.” In Human Growth: A Comprehensive Treatise, eds. 
Falkner, Frank, and J. Tanner. Plenum Press. New York. 
Meng, Xin, and Nancy Qian. 2006. “The Long Run Health and Economic Consequences 
of Famine on Survivors: Evidence from China’s Great Famine.” CEPR 
Discussion Paper No. 5989. 
Merrouche, O. 2006. “The Human Capital Cost of Landmine Contamination in  
 Cambodia,” HiCN, Working Paper 25. 
Miguel, Edward, and Gérard Roland. 2006. “The Long Run Impact of Bombing 
Vietnam.” University of California, Berkeley. Unpublished. 
Miguel, Edward, Shanker Satyanath, and Ernest Sergenti. 2004. “Economic Shocks and 
Civil Conflict: An Instrumental Variables Approach.” Journal of Political 
Economy 114(4): 725-753. 
Ministère de l’Education Nationale. 1999. L’evaluation de m’éducation pour tous – bilan 
a l’an 2000, Rapport des Pays – Burundi , EFA 2000, mid-decade assesments. 
Moulton, Brent. 1986. “Random Group Effects and the Precision of Regression 
Estimates.” Journal of Econometrics 32(3):385-397. 
Ndikumana, Léonce. 2000. “Towards a Solution to Violence in Burundi: A Case for 
Political and Economic Liberalization.” Journal of Modern African Studies 
38(3):431–459. 
29 
 
Nkurunziza, Janvier, and Floribert Ngaruko. 2000. “An Economic Interpretation of 
Conflict in Burundi.” Journal of African Economies 9(3):370–409. 
Obura, Anna. 2008. Staying Power : Struggling to reconstruct education in Burundi since 
1993, International Institute for Educational Planning, UNESCO, Paris 
Republic of Burundi. 1995. Note de Stratégie Economique et Evaluation de la Pauvreté. 
Report No. 13592.  Bujumbura. 
Republic of Burundi 1998. Enquete Prioritaire: Etude Nationale Sur les Conditions de 
Vie des Populations. Bujumbura: Institut de Statistiques et d’Etudes Economiques 
du Burundi. 
Republic of Burundi 2003. Interim Strategic Framework for Accelerating Economic 
Growth and Reducing Poverty. Bujumbura: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper. 
Reyntjens, Filip. 1993. “The Proof of the Pudding Is In the Eating: The June 1993 
Elections in Burundi.” Journal of Modern African Studies 31(4):563-583. 
Reyntjens, Filip. 1998. “Evolution Politique au Rwanda et au Burundi, 1997-1998.” In 
L’Afrique des Grands Lacs. Annuaire 1998-1999, eds. Stefaan Marysse, and Filip 
Reyntjens, 71-96. Paris: L’Harmattan. 
Reyntjens, Filip, and Stef Vandeginste. 1997. “Burundi. Evolution Politique en 1996-
1997.” In L’Afrique des Grands Lacs. Annuaire 1997-1998, eds. Stefaan Marysse, 
and Filip Reyntjens, 1-13. Paris: L’Harmattan. 
Rodriguez, Catherine and Fabio Sanchez. 2009. Armed Con°ict Exposure, Human  
 Capital Investments and Child Labor: Evidence from Colombia. HiCN Working 
Papers, 68. 
Shemyakina, Olga. 2006. “The Effect of Armed Conflict on Accumulation of Schooling: 
Results from Tajikistan.” Journal of Development Economics, 95(2): 186-200 
Stein, Aryeh, Patricia Zybert, Margot Van de Bor, and L.H. Lumey. 2004. “Intrauterine 
Famine Exposure and Body Proportions at Birth: The Dutch Hunger Winter.” 
International Journal of Epidemiology 33(4): 831-836. 
Strauss, John, and Duncan Thomas. 1998. “Health, Nutrition, and Economic 
Development.” Journal of Economic Literature 36(2): 766-817. 
Suri, Tavneet and Michael Boozer. 2007. “Child Labor and Schooling Decisions in 
Ghana.” MIT Sloan. Unpublished. 
30 
 
Swee, Eik. 2009. "On War and Schooling Attainment: The Case of Bosnia and 
Heregovina", HiCN Working Paper 57. 
Tembon, Mercy and Lucia Fort (eds). 2008. “Gender Equality, Empowerment and 
Economic Growth”, the World Bank, Washington DC. 
United Nations. 1996. Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Burundi.   
 Security Council, S/1996/660. New York: United Nations. 
United Nations Population Fund. 2002. Situation Démographique et Sociale au Burundi. 
Résultats de l’Enquête Sociodémographique et de Santé de la Reproduction. 
Burundi: Département de la Population. 
UNESCO, 2011, Education for All Global Monitoring Report, March, Paris 
Valente, Christine. 2011.” What did the Maoists ever do for us ? education and marriage 
of women exposed to civil conflict in Nepal”, World Bank Policy Research 
Working Paper 5741, July. 
World Health Organization. 2002. World Report on Violence and Health. Geneva: World 
Health Organization. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
31 
 
TABLES 
 
 
Table 1: Education indicators and violent conflict 
Indicator 1993 1996 Destruction/dysfunction Re-gained pre-
war level 
Pupils 651086 426535 35% decline  1999 
Gross enrolment 
rate 
67% 42% 37% decline 2002 
 
Net enrolment 
rate 
50% 28% 44% decline 2003 
Teachers 10165 8700 14% decline 1997 
Schools 985 703 29% decline 1999 
classrooms 9211 6548 29% not operational 1996 
     
Source: Obura (2008) p.94-96 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Evolution of the Gross enrolment rate and the Gender Parity Index 
year GER GPI 
1981-1982 34 0.79 
1984-1985 52 0.72 
1989-1990 71 0.80 
1992-1993 70 0.80 
1995-1996 42 0.83 
1996-1997 43 0.83 
1997-1998 52 0.79 
1998-1999 62 0.80 
1999-2000 65 0.80 
2000-2001 69 - 
2001-2002 73 0.75 
2002-2003 77 0.83 
   
  Source: Obura (2008) p.99 
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Table 3: Household, Individual  and Conflict variables in the EDS data (UNFPA, 2002) 
Name of the variable Label values 
Individual    
Age Age in years 16-31 
Sex Gender (Female=1) 0-1 
Primary schooling  Completed 6th  grade (Yes=1) 0-1 
Household    
Livestock in 1993 Pre-war level of livestock owned, expressed in Tropical 
Livestock units (tlu- 
0-20 
Education of head Has the head of the household attended school? (Yes=1) 0-1 
Age of the head Age of the head of the household 20-87 
Sex Gender of the head of the household 0-1 
Orphan Lost at least one parent in 1993 0-1 
Conflict   
Conflict Exposure Number of years a school-aged child is exposed to conflict 
in its province of residence 
0-4 
Camp duration Number of years school-aged child lived in a displacement 
camp 
0-4 
Forced displacement  Number of times a school-aged child had to move 
residence since 1993 
0-8 
 
 
Table 4: Individual and Household Characteristics, by Exposure to Violent Conflict, N=5856 
Name of the variable Not exposed to 
violent conflict 
(n=3586) 
Exposed to violent 
conflict 
(n=2266) 
Difference 
(2)-(1) 
            (1)            (2)          (3) 
At the individual level    
Age 25.1       [0.06] 17.8          [0.03] -7.3*** 
Sex (% female) 60.6       [0.81] 56.5          [1.04] -4.1*** 
Completed primary education 19.8       [0.66] 16.1          [0.77] -3.7*** 
Number of years exposed to 
violent conflict 
0            [0.00] 2.28          [0.02] 2.28*** 
Number of times moved 
residence 
0.087     [0.01] 1.00          [0.02] 0.91*** 
Years spent in a displacement 
camp 
0.015     [0.01] 0.89          [0.03] 0.87*** 
At the household level    
Livestock_1993 1.45        [0.55] 2.02         [0.84] 0.57*** 
One or both parents died in 
1993 
5.76        [0.38] 10.37       [0.63] 4.61*** 
Head educated  (%) 35.56       [1.0] 45.19        [0.8] 9.63*** 
Sex of the head (% female) 22.00       [0.6] 38.90        [1.02] 16.90*** 
Age of the head   37.20      [0.23] 45.36        [0.28] 8.15*** 
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Table 5: Primary education completed, by Province of residence and 
 Exposure to Violent Conflict 
 
Province of 
residence in 
1993 
Death 
rate 
1993 
 
Timing of 
the civil war 
1995-1998 
Primary Education (% completed) Difference 
(5)-(4) Not exposed to 
violent conflict 
exposed to 
violent conflict 
      (1)     (2)       (3)         (4)         (5)      (6) 
Bubanza 4.2 1995-1998 15.90   [3.9] 2.4       [2.4] -13.47** 
Bujumbura 
Rurale 
5.4 1995-1998 26.20   [2.7] 28.64   [3.3] 2.43 
Bururi 3.8 1995/1996 25.04   [1.7] 18.97   [2.4] -6.06** 
Cankuzo 2.5 not affected  16.36  [2.0] -  
Cibitoke 4.9 1995-1998   8.60   [2.3]   6.94   [3.0] -1.66 
Gitega 21.9 1996/1997 32.81   [3.4] 28.50   [2.4] -4.03 
Karuzi 26.7 1995/1996 23.20   [3.8]   9.60   [2.6] -13.60*** 
Kayanza 35.4 1995/1996 27.01   [3.0] 20.70   [2.4] -6.30* 
Mwaro 12.8 1996/1997 20.85   [3.2] 10.81   [2.6] -10.04*** 
Makamba 1.7 1996-1998   9.70   [1.1]   8.38   [1.5] -1.32 
Kirundo 12.1 1996/1997 22.00   [3.4]  16.23  [3.0] -5.76* 
Muyinga 16.0 1995/1996 21.17   [3.5]  11.29  [2.4] -9.86*** 
Muramvya 7.8 1996/1997 39.43   [5.8]  25.97   [2.4] -13.46** 
Ngozi 25.7 1995/1996 16.81   [2.5]   9.44   [1.9] -7.37*** 
Rutana 5.3 not affected   9.9     [2.8] -  
Ruyigi 6.7 1995/1996 19.05   [3.8] 25.00   [8.3]  5.95 
      
Rural 
Burundi 
7%  
(median) 
2.28 years 
(average) 
 19.79  [0.7]  15.98  [0.8] -3.81*** 
*** significant at 1%, ** at 5%, * 10% 
Sources : (2) % of survey respondents whose father was killed in the 1993 massacres (Bundervoet, 2009): 
(3) spread of the civil war over time and space following Chrétien and Mukuri (2000), United Nations 
(1996) and Bundervoet et al (2009). We only take the ‘relevant’ duration into account, this is the period 
that school age children from birth cohorts 1981 to 1986 could have been exposed to the violence; (4) are 
birth cohorts not exposed to violent conflict (neither the massacres nor the civil war when they were 
between 7 and 12 years of age; (5) birth cohorts exposed to violent conflict (either the massacres or the 
civil war or both) when they were between 7 and 12 years of age. 
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Table 6: Baseline specification:  
Logistic regression of Schooling on Gender and Conflict Exposure 
 
 Dependent variable: 
Child completed 6 years 
 of primary schooling 
 
All All All All 
    (1)    (2)     (3)    (4) 
Violent Conflict Shock 
(binary) 
-0.89*** -1.07*** -1.08** -1.02** 
 [0.17] [0.20] [0.20] [0.18] 
     
Child is Female  -0.52*** -0.53*** -0.72*** 
  [0.12] [0.12] [0.11] 
     
Violent Conflict * 
Female 
 0.25 0.25 0.27 
  [0.11] [0.20] [0.18] 
     
Age (in years) -0.06* -0.07* -0.06 -0.03 
 [0.016] [0.016] [0.016] [0.020] 
     
Livestock_1993   0.05** 0.08*** 
   [0.02] [0.013] 
     
Intercept -0.25*** 0.09 -0.02 -1.29** 
 [0.49] [0.50] [0.50] [0.53] 
     
Household Control variables 
(apart from livestock_1993)  
No No No No 
Province Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year of Birth FE  No No No No 
Year of Birth*Female 
 Fixed  Effects  
No No No No 
Household Random Effects No No No Yes 
     
Sample Size 5852 5854 5706 5706 
Wald Chi square test 
statistics 
241.34*** 255.28*** 261.22*** 233.17*** 
*** significant at 1%, ** at 5%, * 10% 
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Table 7:  Fixed Effects and Random Effects estimation of Schooling,  
          Gender, Poverty and Years of Conflict Exposure 
 
Dependent variable: 
Child completed 6 years 
 Of primary schooling 
Poor only Non-poor 
only 
Years 
exposed 
Years  
Exposed 
    (1)       (2)      (3)    (4) 
Violent Conflict Shock 
(binary) 
-0.90*** -1.3**   
 [0.23] [0.31]   
     
Years of violent conflict 
exposure (continuous) 
  -0.57*** -0.27** 
   [0.079] [0.11] 
     
Child is Female -0.65*** -0.94*** -0.76*** -1.1*** 
 [0.13] [0.24] [0.10] [0.42] 
     
Violent Conflict * 
Female  
0.01 0.72** 0.19** 0.15 
 [0.23] [0.30] [0.08] [0.123] 
     
Age (in years) -0.03 -0.03 -0.05***  
 [0.02] [0.03] [0.015]  
     
Livestock_1993 0.17 0.05*** 0.07*** 0.08*** 
  [0.13]  [0.15] [0.013] [0.013] 
     
Intercept -1.48** -1.05 -0.95* -2.7*** 
 [0.64] [0.99] [0.52] [0.54] 
     
Household Control 
variables (apart from 
livestock_1993) 
No No No No 
Province Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year of Birth FE No No No Yes 
Year of Birth*Female 
Fixed Effects  
No No No Yes 
Household Random 
Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Sample Size 3998 1708 5706 5706 
Chi square test statistics 161.55*** 71.49*** 246.36*** 305.48*** 
*** significant at 1%, ** at 5%, * 10% 
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Table 8: Fixed Effects and Random Effects estimation of Schooling, Gender, 
     Poverty and Conflict Exposure, only sons and daughters living at home 
 
 Dependent variable: 
Child completed 6 years 
 of primary schooling 
 
All All Poor only Non-poor only
     (1)       (2)        (3)       (4) 
Years of violent conflict 
exposure 
-0.45*** -0.45*** -0.36** -0.58*** 
 [0.11] [0.11] [0.15] [0.17] 
     
Child is Female -0.65** -0.65** -0.49** -0.82*** 
 [0.18] [0.19] [0.25] [0.27] 
     
Violent Conflict * 
Female  
0.15 0.15 -0.04 0.28* 
 [0.10] [0.10] [0.14] [0.16] 
     
Age (in years) 0.06** 0.06** 0.006* 0.05 
 [0.03] [0.03] [0.04] [0.04] 
     
One or both parents died in 1993  0.23 0.13 0.17 
  [0.31] [0.40] [0.48] 
     
Livestock_1993 0.07*** 0.07***   
 [0.016] [0.016]   
     
Household Head Is Educated 0.44*** 0.43*** 0.42* 0.40* 
 [0.16] [0.16] [0.22] [0.24] 
     
Household Head is Female 0.43*** 0.40** 0.60*** 0.27 
 [0.16] [0.17] [0.21] [0.26] 
     
Household Head’s Age 0.004 0.004 0.001 0.008 
 [0.009] [0.009] [0.01] [0.01] 
     
Intercept -3.82*** -3.83*** -3.55*** -4.27** 
 [0.94] [0.95] [1.18] [1.68] 
     
Province Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year of Birth FE No No No No 
Year of Birth*Female FE  No No No No 
Household Random Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Sample Size 2639 2639 1541 1098 
Chi square test statistics 145.77*** 146.04*** 95.99*** 62.90*** 
*** significant at 1%, ** at 5%, * 10% 
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   Table 9: Fixed Effects and Random Effects estimation of Schooling,  
    Gender and Conflict Exposure, alternative conflict shock measures 
 
Dependent variable: 
Child completed 6  
years of primary  
schooling 
alternative conflict shock measures 
All All All 1978-82  
cohort excluded 
    (1)      (2)     (3)           (4) 
Years of violent  
conflict exposure 
  -0.17** 
 
-0.23** 
 
   [0.09] [0.13] 
     
Number of times 
 moved residence 
-0.19*  -0.24***  
 [0.10]  [0.08]  
     
Number of years spent in a 
displacement camp 
 0.01 0.08  
  [0.07] [0.05]  
     
Child is Female -1.13*** -2.37*** -2.37*** -2.24*** 
 [0.43] [0.76] [0.76] [0.77] 
     
Violent Conflict *Female    0.18 
    [0.16] 
     
Times Moved *Female -0.046    
 [0.15]    
     
Years in Camp *Female  0.02   
  [0.10]   
     
Livestock_1993 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 
 [0.013] [0.013] [0.013] [0.017] 
     
Intercept -1.53*** -1.53*** -2.68*** -3.4*** 
 [0.49] [0.49] [0.53] [0.66] 
     
Province Fixed  Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year of Birth FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year of Birth* Gender FE  Yes Yes No Yes 
Household Random 
 Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Sample Size 5706 5706 5706 3981 
Chi square test statistics 306.09*** 303.26*** 308.04*** 213.05*** 
*** significant at 1%, ** at 5%, * 10% 
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Figure 1: spread of the civil war over space 
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  Figure 2: Primary school completion by birth cohort 
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 Figures 3 and 4: Primary school completion and years of exposure to conflict 
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Appendix: Tables for potential selection problems 
 
Table A1 Poverty and Conflict in poor and non-poor provinces 
 Poor 
provinces 
Non-poor 
provinces 
Difference 
(means test) 
Death rate 1993  15.0 9.7 -5.3 
Duration of  
civil war (in years) 
1.85 2.44 0.59 
*** significant at 1%, ** at 5%, * 10% 
Notes: a province is poor when its headcount poverty ratio is larger than the average 
in rural Burundi. Data are from the 1986-1990 expenditures survey (ECB).  
The death rate is the % of persons in the 2002 UNFPA survey who lost their 
father in 1993 (based on Bundervoet, 2009) and the duration of the civil war 
is based on Chrétien and Mukuri (2000), United Nations (1996) and Bundervoet et al (2009). 
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Table A2: Sons and daughters born in 1970-1987 who died violently in 1993-2002 
 Households with 
no violent death  
1993-2002 
Households with at 
least one violent 
death 1993-2002 
Difference 
(3)-(1) and 
(4)-(2) 
       (1)      (2)     (3)     (4)   (5)    (6) 
    boys    girls   boys   girls boys  girls 
Head of household 
completed prim 
education  
0.34 0.34 0.29 0.20 -0.05 -0.14** 
mother completed 
prim education 
0.07 0.07 0.05 0 -0.02 -0.07** 
Same-sex siblings 
completed prim 
education 
0.23 0.17 0.21 0.25 -0.02 +0.08 
Livestock 1993 2.05 2.0 2.12 2.1 0.07 0.1 
N 1278 1420 55 35  
 
Table A3: Widowed persons born in 1970-1987 who lost their husband/wife 1993-2002 
 Households with 
no death  
1993-2002 
Households with at 
least one death 
1993-2002 
Difference 
(3)-(1) and 
(4)-(2) 
   (1)    (2)     (3)    (4)    (5)   (6) 
 husband 
alive 
wife 
alive 
husband  
died 
wife  
died 
husbands wives 
Wife completed 
prim education 
0.16 0.19 0.18 0.26 0.02 0.07 
Livestock 1993 0.96 0.99 1.73 0.59 0.77*** -0.40 
N 1547 1544 85 19  
Note: Correlation coefficient between level of education of both partners in a  
married couple is 0.48*** 
 
Table A4: 1970-1987 cohorts who migrated abroad after 1993 and returned before 2002  
     (1)           (2)            (3)      (4) 
 Never 
moved  
Moved abroad 
and returned 
before 2002 
Moved abroad for at 
least 4 years and 
returned before 2002 
Difference  
(3)-(1) 
Age 22.35 22.57 22.85 0.50* 
% female  0.59 0.53 0.52 -0.07** 
Livestock_93 1.72 1.79 1.62 -0.10 
Head of household 
educated (sons and 
daughters only) 
0.37 0.46 0.58 0.20*** 
N 4514 1169 173  
 
